Special Issues: 2007
Corporate Ownership Structure
Guest Editors:
- Ron Anderson – American University
- Sattar Mansi – Virginia Tech University
- David Reeb – Temple University
We solicit papers that analyze issues related to corporate ownership structure in publicly traded firms. One common argument is that firms financed by atomistic shareholders are more efficient because they use market-based rules to evaluate investment decisions and facilitate an active market for corporate control. In contrast, others contend that large equity stakes (by managers, institutions, governments, and founding families) are beneficial because they can align the interests of insiders and outsiders, allow for greater monitoring, and provide extended investment horizons. This special issue focuses on understanding these trade-offs among different ownership structures and their impact on corporate decision-making.
Possible paper topics include, but are not limited to:
- Determinants of ownership structure
- Role of controlling shareholders
- Institutional investors and corporate decision making
- Corporate governance and ownership structure
- Valuation and ownership structure in differing regimes
- Industry differences in ownership impacts
- Atomistic shareholders and managerial relations
- Role of the legal system in understanding ownership structure
- Cross-country differences in ownership structure impacts
- Leverage and ownership structure
- Cash Holdings and Ownership
Papers should be submitted electronically to the JEB at jeconbus@temple.edu
Authors should consult the JEB’s webpage at www.sbm.temple.edu/jeb
to conform to the format for electronic submission. All papers will be
refereed and the first review will be completed within 100 days of the
receipt of the manuscript. The
deadline for submission is July 1, 2006. The special issue will be published
in January, 2007.